

16. (C) Federal Security Service (FSB) Deputy Director, Viktor Komogorov, said that Russia had compiled a "huge database" of foreign militants and terrorists who had gone to fight in Chechnya, some of whom could become active in Iraq or Afghanistan. The GOR had offered to compare its contents with the U.S.'s terrorism databases. He added that Russia's annual meeting of intelligence services' representatives from 75 countries in Khanty-Mansiysk had decided to create a joint terrorism databank. More than 20 countries were contributing to the databank, including some European and Middle Eastern countries. The information in the databank was classified and encrypted, and enabled different levels of access to the information. If an inquiry was made about a particular person, then the databank would track the person. The databank also contained analytical information on terrorism issues, such as general trends, suicide bombers, and recruitment. The GOR hoped to expand the databank. Komogorov invited Ambassador Dailey to attend next year's Russian-hosted

annual intelligence gathering.

¶7. (C) Ambassador Dailey, while noting the sensitivities of sharing intelligence information, responded that it was important to exchange information so we could work together more effectively. It was particularly critical to share information on travel of foreign fighters from Iraq, since many of them would seek to go to other countries. While no country could give its friends all of the information in its databank, we could help when provided with a name. Safonov concurred on the need to exchange information.

¶8. (C) Kevin Kellenberger, Counterterrorism Center (CTC) Department Chief, noted that intelligence played a critical role supporting policy, and that the U.S. and Russia were already successfully sharing information, but the intelligence community would always have to balance the need to get the information to the people who required it with the need to protect sources. He said the CTC would use the concept of balance to look at the databank, but that there might be other alternatives to participation in the databank that could be considered to share information, including on the question of terrorist travel.

¶9. (C) In closing, DAS Merkel expressed the desire to share the accomplishments of the CTWG more with the public, as evidence of the value of the U.S.-Russian cooperation, and highlighted the importance of concluding the press statement and fact sheet. Safonov agreed, and stressed the need to be quick in setting the group's tactical and long-term strategic objectives. He closed with a final toast that our strength be up to carrying the burden.

CTWG Plenary Session (June 20)

Afghanistan

¶10. (C) Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, William Burns, thanked Russia for the practical steps taken to stabilize Afghanistan, including writing off Afghan debt, supporting OSCE programs in Afghanistan, and working toward the reconstruction of Afghan infrastructure. SCA/A Acting Director Timothy Wilder thanked Russia for providing \$90 million worth of weapons and military equipment to the Afghan National Army (ANA) between 2002 to 2005, and encouraged the GOR to move forward on its latest proposal to resume

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providing weapons, emphasizing our preference for donations over sales and the importance of coordination with Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A). He called for Russian support for OSCE counternarcotics training efforts, including training within Afghanistan. Wilder provided an overview of ISAF's three-pronged integrated counter-insurgency strategy: (security, governance, reconstruction), and underscored the importance of a politically responsive, Afghan-led reconciliation program to draw disenchanted insurgents off the battlefield. He noted that this consideration informed U.S. views on the matter of 1267 listings and de-listings, to be discussed later. Wilder cited progress in re-establishing the nation's energy distribution system, and encouraged Russia to consider refurbishing dams and hydro-electric plants constructed during the Soviet-era - especially projects in northern Afghanistan.

¶11. (C) MFA Afghanistan Desk Chief, Yuri Khokhlov, noted ISAF success against insurgents that had, in some regions, reduced the Taliban to counterproductive asymmetric attacks against soft targets that caused civilian casualties. He explained that a Russian company was preparing to begin work on reconstructing a power plant in Naghlu, but said that concerns for security minimized Russian business interest in Afghanistan.

¶12. (C) Khokhlov clarified that Russian military aid provided to Afghanistan from 2002-2005 amounted to \$200 million. It was stopped after the GOR learned that the equipment was sitting in warehouses; Afghan officials said they were told not to use the equipment by their "American mentors." Russia was concerned that the utility of future military aid would diminish as the ANA moved toward NATO-standard weapons. Khokhlov asked the U.S. to provide a "clear picture" of Afghan military needs, including how to reach a balance between donated supplies and commercial procurement. Kislyak seconded Khokhlov's description of Russian frustration over learning the ANA's needs, and called upon the U.S. to "send a more coherent message." (Note: Kislyak provided U/S Burns a copy of a letter from the U.S. Defense Attache in Kabul to his Russian counterpart explaining that the U.S. "will not permit the Afghan government to use U.S. funds to purchase equipment directly from the Russian government" and that the ANA will transition in many cases from Russian standard equipment to U.S./NATO equipment. End note.)

¶13. (C) Safonov stressed that the U.S. and Russia must avoid public debate over their respective military roles in Afghanistan. Kislyak concurred, saying that Afghanistan should not be turned into a venue where the U.S. and Russia are competing over each other's public image. U/S Burns agreed that public polemics should be avoided, and suggested follow-up discussions to develop a way forward on military aid, OSCE proposals, and possible cooperation on infrastructure. (Note: In subsequent discussions on the margins with Wilder, Khokhlov proposed sending a Russian delegation to Washington later in the summer for follow-up consultations on weapons transfers and project assistance. He expected there could be progress on both fronts, noting that while there had been some mixed messages from the U.S. on weapons, Russia was open to providing some weapons as a donation - though Russia was ultimately looking for a mix of donations and sales.)

Counternarcotics

¶14. (C) Kislyak urged the U.S. to use the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) to push Afghanistan to do more to fight the trafficking of illicit drugs, but stressed that any high level engagement of the NRC should be results-oriented. He lamented the lack of Afghan recruits to Russian MOI counternarcotics training center at Domodedovo Airport in Moscow, and wondered aloud if the U.S. wanted to see Afghan counternarcotics officers train in Western countries rather than Russia. Noting that Russia is a major transit point for narcotics headed to Europe and the U.S., Kislyak urged

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greater cooperation to deal with this mutual threat. He also argued for greater interoperability of forces to combat the Afghan drug problem.

¶15. (C) Embassy Moscow's Law Enforcement Section (LES) Chief Peter Prahar responded that the U.S. fully supported the NRC Counternarcotics Project and would contribute USD 100,000 to the Project's budget. He also said the NATO Secretary General was working to persuade Afghanistan to resume participation in counternarcotics training programs outside Afghanistan.

DEA and FSKN Liaison Officer Cooperation

¶16. (C) Deputy Director of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) Aleksandr Fedorov touted U.S.-Russian cooperation in fighting narcotics trafficking, especially along the Tajik border. He said 14 seminars have been held in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Omsk, the Budapest Law Enforcement Academy, and other places, to share information on issues

such as confiscating drug money. The GOR has also sent its officers to UN conferences in Vienna. Fedorov argued that more data and information sharing between counternarcotics services is needed.

¶17. (C) Prahar responded that the DEA would like to exchange samples of seized drugs and is willing to host Russian chemists on a study tour to the DEA Special Testing Laboratory. He also invited members of the GOR's newly-established State Anti-Narcotics Committee to visit the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, DEA Headquarters, and other facilities that combat drugs. Prahar also announced plans to reopen the DEA office in Tashkent in August and to assign a DEA officer to Almaty.

UNODC Paris Pact

¶18. (C) Calling the Afghan drug problem "sad," Fedorov called for a regional counternarcotics center to be built in Almaty. He also argued more counternarcotics efforts should be directed at kingpins and their sources of finance rather than "rank and file" drug dealers. He also suggested a separate counternarcotics working group be established.

¶19. (C) Prahar referred to the upcoming Paris Pact Working Group meeting on financial flows related to the Afghan drug trade. He also noted that the world's attention is focused on the precursor issue and the tightening of controls on the manufacture and trade of chemical precursors, as UNSCR 1817, passed June 11, demonstrated. He said the U.S. also welcomed the start of Targeting Anti-Trafficking Regional Communication, Expertise, and Training (TAR CET) to combat trafficking of acetic anhydride to Afghanistan and said all Paris Pact members should support this effort.

Narco-Finance Networks

¶20. (C) Kislyak argued for establishing "financial safety belts" along Afghanistan's border to prevent drug money from financing terrorism and crime. He said the GOR would continue to support the Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO) Operation Channel, which includes drug interdiction blitzes along northern trafficking routes from Afghanistan, as a way to build up such safety belts. Kislyak touted Operation Channel's success over the past four years, but said the international community should do more along Afghanistan's border to deprive terrorists and criminals of money.

¶21. (C) First Deputy Head of the Federal Service on Financial Monitoring, Yuriy Korotkiy, argued that drug financing is tantamount to terrorist financing, and pointed to trilateral cooperation between the U.S., the United Kingdom, and Russia as a model for future efforts to fight narco-finance. The group's investigations, he said, uncovered many links between many of those who profit from narcotics trafficking are also on UNSCR 1267 sanctions lists. Counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts therefore should be closely coordinated, he argued.

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¶22. (C) According to Korotkiy, the Eurasia Group (EAG) should be the first line of defense in the fight against narco-finance. Through the EAG, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have established new government agencies to fight narco-finance in the region. The GOR has hosted workshops to strengthen these new organizations and engage in human capacity building. More must be done to engage Afghanistan in such efforts, he said, but offering that cooperation should not be limited in focus to one country.

Central Asia Regional Information Coordination Center

¶23. (C) Prahar urged the GOR to take the necessary steps to sign and ratify the CARICC Framework Agreement. Fedorov

said the GOR has the necessary documents to sign up to CARICC and does not see any impediments to joining. He stopped short, however, of giving an estimated date for when Russia would sign the Framework Agreement.

United Nations (UN 1267 Listings and Delistings)

¶24. (C) U/S Burns expressed U.S. concern that the UN 1267 (al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions) process must be strengthened by designating drug traffickers whose activities financed terrorists and delisting former insurgents who had reconciled with the Afghan government. IO Deputy Assistant Secretary Brian Hook said that we need to make progress on the listing and delisting of Al-Qaeda and Taliban individuals and entities. He noted that we raised the issue in 2005, and the problem has only grown worse with wide criticism that the 1267 list is frozen in time, particularly the Taliban list. Out of date lists lack credibility, he said, which hurts implementation by Member States. He explained that Russian approval of one or some ex-Taliban delistings would send a "positive message" to Member States that were concerned 1267 sanctions had become a "life sentence," and that it would create the conditions for new Taliban listings. DAS Hook also registered concern with the Russian holds on three of our proposed listings in the 1267 Committee and six in the Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1518 (sanctions on former regime elements under Sadaam Hussein).

¶25. (C) Kislyak agreed 1267 should not be a "life sentence," but warned against "over optimism" regarding a reconciliation process that allowed the Taliban to return to power. Delisting someone, he said, does not make him a partner because he is still part of the Taliban network. We should make the UN machinery efficient. Further, Kislyak said that delisting required "clear cut criteria" showing that the individual was no longer affiliated with terrorist or drug trafficking networks. He warned that delisting an individual did not make them a partner of the Afghan government and said those with "blood on their hands" should not be allowed in the government.

¶26. (C) Khokhlov explained that Russia was a "strong believer" in reconciling mid-level Taliban leaders to the Afghan government, but there must be limits to who could participate in such a process. He called for a "transparent process" headed by the Afghans themselves. Khokhlov noted that Russia was often accused of "being stubborn" when it came to delisting, but defended Russian caution with the example of a supposedly deceased Taliban member who, after being delisted, was found to be alive. Furthermore, Russian requests to the Government of Afghanistan for more information on the reconciliation program were not answered, he alleged.

¶27. (C) MFA New Threats and Challenges Director Vladimir Chkhikhvishvili said the GOR was not confident Afghan authorities had the ability to control individuals after they were delisted and lacked the ability to guarantee that funds unfrozen after deceased individuals were delisted were not used to finance terrorism. Chkhikhvishvili was also surprised by DAS Hook's remarks regarding their holds in the 1267 and 1518 Committees, noting that the GOR responds rapidly to our requests except for a few exceptions.

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Terrorism Finance

¶28. (C) Treasury Director of Global Affairs in the Office of Terrorist Finance and Financial Crimes Brian Grant said combating terrorism finance was a "robust area" of U.S.-Russia cooperation. In particular, he described

U.S.-Russia cooperation in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body dedicated to the development of international policies to combat money laundering and terrorism financing, as good and praised Russia for its leadership in the Eurasian Group, a FATF-style regional body. He highlighted the need for the U.S. and Russia to work together to press Uzbekistan to reinstate the anti-money laundering/terrorist finance regime the GOU suspended until 2013 and described recent FATF statements expressing concern over the Uzbek action. (NOTE: During the June 18-20 FATF plenary, the FATF reaffirmed its February 28 statement identifying Uzbekistan's suspension of its anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CTF) regime as a vulnerability in the international financial system and noted Uzbekistan's continued lack of progress in addressing this issue. END NOTE.) Grant suggested a variety of possible steps, such as a suspension of Uzbekistan's membership in the Eurasian Group or limiting Uzbek access to the Russian financial system if the Uzbek government did not return to international financial standards. He also raised concern about Turkmenistan's AML/CFT regime.

¶29. (C) Korotkiy said Russia shared U.S. concerns about Uzbekistan and was attempting to convince the Uzbek government to reconsider its decision. He reviewed measures taken by the FATF to press Uzbekistan, but Chkhikhvishvili warned that punitive measures could be counterproductive. Kislyak agreed on the need to press Uzbekistan, but cautioned this must be done "carefully and thoughtfully" in order to allow the Uzbek government to respond to the international community while also saving face. He emphasized the importance of working through the EAG Secretariat.

¶30. (SBU) EEB Director for Terrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy, Steven Bondy, thanked Russia for its support of the initiative in the G8 to implement FATF Special Recommendation Eight on combating terrorist abuse of non-profit organizations. Referring to Russia's leadership in the EAG, he suggested that Russia consider organizing a regional session on implementing Special Recommendation Eight and offered to consult with the GOR bilaterally to address the substantive elements of a workshop. In response, Chkhikhvishvili praised the G8 initiative and said that Russia faced challenges in delinking terrorists from charities in the North Caucasus. After the meeting, Chkhikhvishvili suggested the CTWG Terrorism Finance Subgroup meet soon to discuss next steps on charities and other initiatives on the margins of some multilateral event such as the Lyon-Roma Group or a FATF meeting.

Intelligence and Law Enforcement

¶31. (S) FSB Service for the Protection of Constitutional System and Fight against Terrorism Deputy Head Mikhail Belousov provided numerous examples of counterterrorism cooperation by U.S. and Russian intelligence and law enforcement agencies to illustrate that cooperation had gone beyond mere talk and reached a practical level. He emphasized that counterterrorism finance has been a part of the subgroup's work, noting that a large portion of terrorist financing occurred through Hawalas. He noted that U.S. and Russian Intelligence Subgroup experts had met to exchange information on terrorist groups, including Tatar Jamaat, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Union, and North Caucasus-linked terrorists. He also stated that the U.S. and Russia had worked together against extremists in the North Caucasus. He cited several areas where additional progress was possible, including reaching agreement on how

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best to combat terrorists' use of the Internet and cyber-crime. He also cited the need to improve cooperation

on preventing terrorism finance through illegal commercial transactions.

¶32. (C) Kellenberger agreed with Belousov's assessment that the intelligence cooperation had progressed. He noted that the decision at the last meeting of the U.S.-Russian Intelligence and Law Enforcement Subgroups in November to hold one formal meeting rather than two per year reflected the advance. He observed that the move also reflected the reality that our efforts are better served through passing information in a timely manner vice waiting for the formal sessions. Kislyak reinforced the point, noting that even though the CTWG last met in 2006, law enforcement agencies continued engagement in the field.

¶33. (U) FBI Section Chief for Counterterrorism James Robertson saluted FBI-GOR law enforcement cooperation, but asked that the GOR respond to a recent MLAT request for information on Al-Haramain, a U.S.-based charity facing trial for material support to terrorists. The request asks whether the GOR has any information indicating Al-Haramain financed terrorist operations in the North Caucasus.

¶34. (C) U/S Burns stressed U.S.-Russia cooperation on bringing to justice those responsible for the murder of Russian diplomats in Iraq. He said the U.S. was committed on a political level to help GOR officials access to the suspects held by the Iraqis, and that the U.S. would attempt to expedite this once Russia made a formal request to the Iraqi government for access to the suspects.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism

¶35. (C) Ambassador Dailey began by stressing the critical nature of our joint work on WMD Terrorism, most importantly the need for the GOR to reaffirm its commitment to the workplan adopted by both sides at the February WMD Subgroup meeting. He also called for a reciprocal WMD terrorism threat brief by the GOR, (which they had promised to provide in February) at the next Subgroup meeting. Ambassador Dailey then provided a detailed review of the commitments in the workplan. He urged the GOR to clarify their interest in a U.S.-proposed nuclear forensics plan and a consequence management MOU with the Department of Energy, and also to indicate whether a July-August timeframe would suit Russia for planning meetings on a bioterrorism tabletop exercise, a law enforcement methodological exchange, and a foreign consequence management seminar.

¶36. (C) Safonov asserted that a WMD terrorism attack was a Russian 'red line' and responded that such an attack was not a matter of "if," but "when." He noted that the fourth meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) held in Madrid earlier in the week demonstrated that the GICNT mechanism was valuable, with "practical and political outcomes." He noted that every year we have held numerous workshops, meetings, and discussions on training personnel and share research and development information. As an example, Safonov said Russia had moved forward on a large project involving the CIS to coordinate transportation and nuclear security. He said that while there had been successes, they "hadn't achieved the level of interoperability they would like and did not know if their systems would all work together." Safonov also noted that the GOR needed to streamline its priorities and decide on sequencing - although he averred that Russia was moving forward on preparations for meetings in July. While the Russian side did not directly respond to a U.S. invitation to visit a DOE training facility on secure ground transport of nuclear materials, Safonov called for both sides to work more closely on developing common standards to check radioactive material on air planes. Chkhikhvishvili added that Russia is ready to exchange bioterrorism threat methodologies, but that both sides needed to agree on substance and timeframe. He said that the GOR would be in touch soon on U.S. consequence management proposals. (COMMENT: In a sidebar with

Ambassador Dailey, Chkhikhvishvili admitted he was 'confused' about Russian commitments to the WMD workplan, revealing that Ambassador Titorenko had not relayed Russia's commitment to it in February. END COMMENT.)

Proposed Framework on Nuclear Forensics

¶37. (C) Safonov related an experience with nuclear forensics involving a highly enriched uranium (HEU) sample interdicted on the Turkish - Bulgarian border, had resulted in lengthy negotiations and the development of new protocols. He said Russia "had to create methods to do this." But now, there were other cases, like the Georgian HEU sample, and Russia needed to set up temporary legal frameworks to handle these problems. Safonov added that recent exercises with NATO demonstrated shortcomings in nuclear forensics, as current Russian customs regulations were not flexible enough to handle the various international groups and their equipment on short notice. Anatoliy Bushlya, Principal Specialist from Rosatom State Corporation, said Russia had established procedures for exchanges of samples and had visited emergency centers in the U.S. He stated that Russia recently performed an exercise in St. Petersburg and envisioned similar training in the U.S. later in 2008.

Transportation of Radiological and Nuclear Material

¶38. (C) Vladimir Chertok, Deputy Head of the Transport Supervising Agency, stated his concern regarding radiation detection. He said that while Russian airport security was much like that in U.S. airports, the U.S. and Russia needed to "work together" to figure out the levels of radiation "we want to detect". He elaborated that problems with traces of radioactive materials, coupled with unfamiliar technologies in foreign aircraft, made the process difficult for Russia.

Consequence Management

¶39. (C) Igor Neverov, MFA Director of the North America Department, said that the U.S. and Russia needed to intensify coordination on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issues - not just that of Iran. He stated that the GICNT was a good mechanism for this. He also said he hoped to provide a response to the USG on these issues soon.

----- MANPADS -----

¶40. (C) While noting that none of his experts were in the room, Safonov related an example of cooperation on MANPADS. Through FBI and FSB cooperation a plot involving terrorists, criminals, and narcotics to acquire these missiles and smuggle them into the U.S. was discovered and defeated. Safonov also noted that the RF had requested all of the former Soviet republics to account by serial number for all MANPADS weapons still in their possession. He stated that with the exception of Ukraine and Georgia, this had been accomplished. EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary David Merkel noted the upcoming MANPADS experts meeting in Moscow July 28-30. Safonov said that it was important to use such venues to emphasize that MANPADS security and control were a shared interest. When the message was put out "alone, in different geographic regions, it was not as powerful as when we do so jointly."

----- Transportation Security -----

¶41. (C) Vladimir Chertok, Deputy Head Transport Supervising Agency, opened the Transportation Security session with a few general comments expressing the positive nature of the work that had preceded the plenary session. However, he said that

while the proposals were fine, moving forward on some of the issues had slowed, and Russia was still having difficulty with a draft Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on peer-to-peer partnerships sent to them in 2005. Even though there were Terms of Reference in force, we needed to meet and show each other what we were doing and back it up with a comprehensive

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document. (Note: Chertok and TSA Assistant Administrator Bill Gaches met after the CTWG for an extensive bilateral discussion. End Note.)

¶42. (U) Bill Gaches, Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Assistant Administrator for the Office of Global Strategies, responded they were anxious to establish an expanded relationship with Russia and build on the productive meeting in May between Federal Authority Transportation Oversight's (FATO) Alexander Sveshnikov and TSA Administrator, Kip Hawley. Gaches noted that the U.S. and Russia share many common views on the threats to transportation. Noting the growth in U.S. airline service to Russia - approximately 40,000 passengers per month, inbound and outbound - Gaches called for finalization of the draft MOA on peer-to-peer partnerships and revised Terms of Reference as well as additional peer-to-peer meetings.

Air Marshals

¶43. (C) Chertok said the RF legislative framework did not allow for armed air marshals onboard commercial flights. It was a legal issue which could have repercussions on the marshals when they arrived in Russia. Chertok stated, "our lawmakers are very negative on this." Oleg Zhidkov, Deputy Chief of Staff, National Anti-Terrorist Committee added that the "problem was urgent" and not just in air transport. All modes of transportation must be addressed. He said that Russia had put forward a project for railways and hoped the recommended standards would be implemented by the G8. This was seconded by Safonov, who clarified that the Russians had a "painful experience" with the use of firearms onboard a plane. In 1973, during an attempted highjacking, the perpetrator had explosives with a dead man switch. When he was shot, the explosives detonated, killing all on board. Since then, there had been a prohibition on firearms on board. Safonov suggested that with modern, non-lethal technologies such as Tasers, it might be possible to resolve this problem through bilateral and multilateral agreements. Vladimir Makarov of the Ministry of Interior indicated that more research needed to be conducted by ICAO regarding the use of non-lethal weapons that would not threaten the integrity of an aircraft. Gaches noted the productive Hawley-Sveshnikov meeting, TSA's desire to resolve outstanding differences on a bilateral FAMS Memorandum of Understanding, its standing invitation to Russian officials to visit TSA's training facilities, the need for 24-hour points of contact, and its readiness to share additional information on liquids, gels and aerosols.

¶44. (C) After the U.S. delegation gave a summary of threats and cooperative efforts, Kislyak stated our cooperation has been successful in combating terrorism and the criminal threat. He expressed the view that much would be accomplished in the separate subgroups that were to meet after the CTWG plenary.

Central Asian CT Cooperation

¶45. (C) In a sidebar discussion, Ambassadors Dailey and Safonov sought a way to deepen U.S. and Russian cooperation on counterterrorism capacity building in Central Asia. Safonov proposed that the two sides engage in a bilateral exchange of information on ongoing projects and ideas to strengthen efforts, suggesting a focus on counterterrorism, counterterrorism finance, and counternarcotics. Dailey requested that such an exchange occur under a multilateral framework with broader participation, and focus on civilian

(non-military) assistance. Safonov agreed, offering the FATF-style Eurasia Group as a good example of how a regional umbrella had worked in countering terrorism finance. Both sides agreed to compare ideas on ways forward in the near future.

Meeting Conclusion

¶46. (C) DAS Merkel and Safonov closed the session, agreeing that, working through the embassies, a list of "next steps"

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would be produced within two weeks. The atmosphere as the meeting wound down was very positive. Safonov's final comment was "this is like the theater after a good show; no one wants to leave."

¶47. (SBU) Delegation List: United States: DOS: U/S for Political Affairs William Burns, Charge d'Affaires Daniel Russell, S/CT Coordinator Dell Dailey, EUR DAS David Merkel, IO DAS Brian Hook, EUR/RUS Dir Ian Kelly, EEB/ESC/TFS Dir Steven Bondy, SCA/A A/Dir Timothy Wilder, ISN/WMDT DepDir David Weekman, LES Dir Peter Prahar, P Spec. Asst. Sumona Guha, EUR/PGI CTWG Exec Dir Lonni Reasor, S/CT Zachary Rothschild, Emb PolMinCouns Alice Wells, Emb PolExt Chief Margaret Hawthorne, Emb Poloffs Michael Kelleher, Nickolas Katsakis, Emb ESToff Michael Dunkley, DOS Interpreter Yuri Shkeyrov, Emb Interpreter Marina Gross. NSC: SAP Sr Dir Mary Warlick. OSD: DASD Special Ops Dr. Kalev Sepp, Rus deskoff Michael Barnes. Treasury: Dir Brian Grant. Intelligence Community: CTC Dept Chief Kevin Kellenberger, Emb: Timothy Lattig. FBI: CT Div. Int'l Ops Section II Chief James Robertson. DOJ: CT Section, Deputy Chief Sharon Lever. DHS/TSA: Office of Global Strategies, Asst Administrator William Gaches, Int'l Office Bert Williams.

¶48. (SBU) Delegation List: Russia: DFM Sergey Kislyak, Special Presidential Representative for CT Anatoliy Safonov, State Secretary, DepDir, Federal Drug Control Service Aleksandr Fedorov, Security Council Deputy Secretary Vladimir Nazarov (dinner only), Security Council Chief of Directorate Yevgeniy Nikitenko, FSB Director 5th Dept. Viktor Komogorov (dinner only), FSB Deputy Head Mikhail Belousov, SVR Director CT Center Petr Bayulin (dinner only), National Anti-Terrorism Committee Deputy Chief of Staff Oleg Zhidkov, MOD Chief of Directorate Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy, Fed. Service on Financial Monitoring First Deputy Head Yuriy Korotkiy, Transport Supervising Agency Vladimir Chertok, MFA Director North America Dept. Igor Neverov, MFA Director New Threats and Challenges Vladimir Chkhikhvishvili, MFA Director of International Organizations Gennadiy Gatilov, Vladimir Makarov, Ministry of Interior, Transport Supervising Agency Sr State Inspector Nadezhda Malikova, SVR CT Center Deputy Head Aleksey Martynkin, RosAtom Principal Specialist Anatoliy Bushlya, Security Council Counselor Stanislav Ivanov, FSB Int'l Cooperation Directorate First Deputy Head Denis Sibayev, FSB Information Security Center Officer Dmitriy Stolyarov, MFA N. Amer. DepDir Nikolay Sofinskiy, MFA Second Asia Dept. Section Chief Yuriy Khokhlov, MFA Principal Counselor El'brus Kargiyev, MFA N. Amer. Sr Counselor (Sec'y of CTWG) Shakarbek Osmanov, MFA Sr. Counselor Vladimir Prokhorov, FSB Officer Ella Mal'tseva, International Cooperation Directorate Roman Vladimirov, Yuriy Patrin.
RUSSELL